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Timor-Leste
The evidence-based policy (EBP) movement has received significant attention in the
scientific literature; however, there is still very little empirical research to provide insight into
how policy decisions are made and how evidence is used. The lack of research on this
topic in low- and middle-income countries is of particular note. We examine the maternity
waiting home policy in Timor-Leste to understand the role of context, policy character-
istics, individual actors, and how evidence is used to influence the policy agenda. The
research tracked the maternity waiting home policy from 2005 to 2009 and is based on in-
depth interviews with 31 senior policy-makers, department managers, non-government
organization representatives, and United Nations advisors. It is also informed by direct
observation, attendance at meetings and workshops, and analysis of policy documents.
The findings from this ethnographic case study demonstrate that although the post-
conflict context opened up space for new policy ideas senior Ministry of Health officials
rather than donors had the most power in setting the policy agenda. Maternity waiting
homes were appealing because they were a visible, non-controversial, and logical solution
to the problem of accessing maternal health services. Evidence was used in a variety of
ways, from supporting pre-determined agendas to informing new policy directions. In
the pursuit of EBP, we conclude that the power of research to inform policy lies in its
timeliness and relevance, and is facilitated by the connection between researchers and
policy-makers.
Keywords: Timor-Leste, evidence-based policy, maternity waiting homes, maternal health policy, policy theory,
actors, agenda setting, power
Introduction
In order to improve public health outcomes, the need for evidence-based policy (EBP) has gained
prominence over the last two decades. EBP promotes a rational and coordinated approach to
policy-making based on a comprehensive assessment of research to build an evidence base (1).
In this sense, evidence is the culmination of knowledge based on rigorous scientific research.
Despite widespread advocacy of this approach, significant barriers to the use of both research
and evidence remain. Oliver et al. (2) compared three systematic reviews on EBP and found
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the common barriers to using research across all three reviews
were:
1. lack of personal relationships and contacts between decision-
makers and researchers;
2. the need for research to be clearly and accessibly presented.
Similarly, Behague et al. (3) (p. 1542) found the EBPmovement
“has failed to curb long-standing problems with : : : advocacy-
driven ‘fad-like’ shifts in policy recommendations.” The EBP lit-
erature has tended to focus on how research can have an impact
on policy, rather than the policy process itself. Importantly, Oliver
et al. (2) point to the lack of ethnographic and anthropological
approaches to policy analysis. We contribute to filling this gap
in knowledge by providing an ethnographic case study of how
research and policy interact in a developing country health sys-
tem. An in-depth analysis of the maternity waiting home policy
in Timor-Leste helps to illuminate the complex processes behind
policy decisions and the use of evidence in post-conflict and
low-resource settings.
Country Context
Timor-Leste achieved independence from Indonesia following a
violent referendum in 1999. Like other countries with a history
of conflict, Timor-Leste has an extremely high maternal mor-
tality ratio, estimated to be as high as 929/100,000 live births
(4). Reducing maternal mortality and improving access to health
facilities was prioritized by the Timorese government and the
manynon-government organizations (NGOs) andUnitedNations
(UN) agencies entering the country during the reconstruction
phase. Although there are many ways (5), the Ministry of Health
in Timor-Leste, like many countries, chose to focus on promoting
facility-based delivery (6–8). In order to improve access to facility-
based birth for women in remote areas, the maternity waiting
home idea was introduced by UNFPA representatives (9) and a
National Maternity Waiting Home Strategy was developed by the
Timorese Government in 2005 (10). The concept of maternity
waiting homes was first developed by medical doctors in Africa
in the 1950s (11). They are houses, located near hospitals, where
women canwait in theweeks prior to their due date in order to give
birth in a health facility (12). The concept has been promoted as a
strategy to “bridge the geographical gap,” and thus aims to improve
access to obstetric services for women in rural and remote areas
(12) (p. 1). However, there is limited evidence to suggest they are
an effective strategy in reducing maternal or perinatal mortality,
or improving access to care for women in remote areas (13, 14).
The initial plan in Timor-Leste was to pilot maternity waiting
homes in three districts, and this soon increased to five dis-
tricts (15). Enthusiasm for the strategy grew at both the national
and district level, and policy-makers suggested they should be
established nation-wide. In 2007, they were incorporated into the
national Basic Services Package, which meant that they could be
implemented in every health post, health center, and hospital in
the country (7). This enthusiasm for maternity waiting homes in
Timor-Leste raises important questions about the use of evidence,
why certain ideas are enthusiastically taken up at the local level,
and the interests and agendas influencing policy decisions.
Some research has been conducted on global-level forces that
influence national policy systems, but less is known about the
mechanisms through which local actors influence policy, particu-
larly in low-income countries (16). Behague et al. (3) point out that
a deeper analysis of national and sub-national policy processes
should be conducted to understand the factors which inhibit the
use of evidence in policy. There has been a call for further research
which incorporates the voices of local actors and assesses the
weight of different causal factors and their interactive effects in
raising issues on the political agenda (17). de Leeuw et al. (18) also
argue that studying health policy requires an understanding of its
development process. As researchers working in the country, we
were in an ideal position to study the development and implemen-
tation of the maternity waiting home policy from 2005 to 2009.
Theoretical Orientation
In their review, Oliver et al. (2) argue that much of the research
on EBP remains atheoretical and call for more critically and theo-
retically informed studies of decision-making. Drawing on policy
theory from the political sciences provides a powerful tool kit to
help explain why things are happening, beyond a description that
they are happening (18).
Kingdon’s (19) work on how policies become prominent in
national agendas has been one of the most influential in the
discipline of policy analysis. Kingdon outlines how problems,
policies, and politics merge at certain points to create windows of
opportunity for governments to act. He highlights the importance
of policy championswho act as advocates for policies that promote
their values and personal interests, and protect their bureaucratic
space. Kingdon’s theory is well articulated; however, the research
was based in the United States in the 1970s and may not be
applicable in the context of political processes in low-income
countries where overseas aid features heavily.
Walt and Gilson (20) also emphasize the central role of actors
and how their position, power, values, and expectations influence
the policy process. Other significant factors in this model include
context, policy content, and political processes. Importantly, pol-
icy analysis benefits from an understanding of the complexities
and interrelationships of all these factors. Shiffman and Smith (17)
have presented a similar framework for assessing political priority
for global health initiatives, with a focus on actors, ideas, context,
and issue characteristics.
Each model has considerable explanatory power. Common
elements in thesemodels point to the critical role of context, policy
characteristics, and actors in influencing policy processes. What
remains is to test the applicability of these elements in developing
country health systems. If these models hold, then what is the role
of evidence and how is it used to influence the policy agenda?
This research uses the common elements of these models to assess
the relative importance of political context, policy characteristics,
international advisors, national actors, and different forms of
evidence in prioritizing maternity waiting homes in Timor-Leste.
Materials and Methods
This ethnographic case study of thematernitywaiting homepolicy
in Timor-Leste was carried out by the lead author, Kayli Wild,
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from 2005 to 2009 as part of her doctoral research (21). Kayli
Wild conducted all interviews and was responsible for data col-
lection and analysis. The co-authors Lesley Barclay, Paul Kelly,
and Nelson Martins in their capacity as supervisors, provided
input into study design, accessing key informants, and criti-
cally revising the manuscript. To position the researchers, Kayli
Wild and Lesley Barclay could be considered feminist researchers
with an interest in advocating for women’s preferences when
shaping maternal health policy and services. At the outset, we
took a critical approach to understanding the role of maternity
waiting homes. Given the lack of evidence for the effective-
ness of maternity waiting homes in the international literature,
we wanted to use the most rigorous methods to test whether
they were working to address the needs of rural women in
Timor-Leste (14). The literature on EBP does not usually involve
policy-makers as co-authors, indicating that they are largely
absent in developing or carrying out policy-relevant research
(2). During data collection for this research, co-author Nelson
Martins became the Minister for Health in Timor-Leste. Thus,
he acted as supervisor, participant observer, and the subject
of research. We acknowledge the potential conflict of interest
in this dual role and also the unique insights it can provide.
Kayli Wild, as an independent researcher, has retained con-
trol of data analysis and interpretation. While we have pro-
tected the anonymity of specific policy actors we have remained
candid about the role of senior decision-makers in the policy
process.
Participants who were knowledgeable about maternal health
policy were recruited in Dili as this is the capital city and
central hub of decision-making and influence in Timor-Leste.
Data were triangulated by interviewing informants from a
range of organizations and from different levels within orga-
nizations, including local and international NGOs, UN agency
representatives involved in maternal health, technical advisors,
senior decision-makers in the Ministry of Health, and man-
agers in the Maternal and Child Health and Policy and Plan-
ning departments (Table 1). Purposive snowball sampling was
used whereby an initial small group of people involved with
maternal health were identified and they were asked to rec-
ommend others who were knowledgeable about the maternity
waiting home policy. Thirty-one interviews were conducted from
July to December 2007. In addition to key informant inter-
views over 6months of fieldwork, data were collected during
regular visits to the country from 2005 to 2009. Other data
collection methods included participant observation and infor-
mal discussion, attendance at meetings and workshops, and
analysis of policy documents, workshop minutes, and NGO
reports.
TABLE 1 | Number of interviews with key informants, by organization.
Organization Number of Interviews
Ministry of Health 9
UN Agency 9
International NGO 8
Local NGO 5
Total 31
A semi-structured interview schedule was used to interview
key informants. This contained a set of open-ended questions
relating towhen andhow thematernitywaiting home concept first
appeared in Timor-Leste, the role of different actors in influencing
the policy agenda, the informants’ perspective on the maternity
waiting home policy and its implementation, the use of evidence
in policy decisions, and priorities in maternal health. Most inter-
views took place in person at the participant’s office in Dili, with
the exception of one interviewwhichwas done over the telephone.
As some important informants had left the country, effort was
made to contact these people and correspond via email. Interviews
were conducted in English when the participant was confident
speaking the language, which was the case for 26 interviews. Five
interviews were in Tetum using an interpreter, and these were
subsequently translated and analyzed in English.
A plain language information sheet summarizing the research
project was given to participants in English and Tetum. Signed
consent to participate in the interview was gained from each
participant, and permission was requested to use a digital tape
recorder. Seventeen interviews were tape recorded and tran-
scribed and for 14 interviews detailed noteswere taken. Interviews
usually lasted 1 h. The research was carried out with written
permission from the Timorese Ministry of Health. Full ethical
approval was obtained from theHuman Research Ethics Commit-
tee at Menzies School of Health Research, Australia.
The qualitative research software NVivo7© was used to orga-
nize all data including transcripts, discussion notes, and field
notes. Data analysis began with broad categories of evidence,
actors, policy characteristics, and context. These categories were
then populated by themes that emerged through coding each
interview. Common and repeated themes were investigated across
interviews to understand what informants were saying in relation
to specific topics, and to assess the strength and importance of var-
ious themes. A comparative analysis was conducted to understand
the views of internal/national versus external/international actors,
as well as senior decision-makers versus mid-level department
managers.
Results
Context
The crisis situation in Timor-Leste after the 1999 referendum
resulted in many NGOs and UN agencies entering the country,
each of whom brought new ideas, agendas, and resources. The
influence of international organizations and global policy ideas
was amplified because there was very little existing policy or
bureaucratic structure. In the violent aftermath of the referendum,
the Indonesian military and pro-integration militia destroyed
much of the country’s infrastructure and most of the Indonesian
health workforce and management left Timor-Leste. Thus, the
policy space for health issues was expanded by this new layer of
providers, ideologies, and ways of working. New policy options
were introduced through UN agency representatives and the
East Timorese Health Professionals Working Group (which was
formed by the Timorese doctors who remained in the country
and which became the foundation for the first Timorese Ministry
of Health). Addressing the high rates of maternal mortality was
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firmly entrenched in Timor-Leste’s health policy agenda from the
beginning. The crisis situation and incoming actors created a
“windowof opportunity” to take action and develop programs and
policies.
Policy Characteristics
The National MaternityWaiting Home Strategy was developed by
the Maternal and Child Health department, who were assisted by
UNFPA and a technical working group (10, 15). Within the policy
there was recognition of the need for other components of the
health systems, such as emergency obstetric care and trainingmid-
wives (6, 15); however, key informants described how maternity
waiting homes came to be thought of as the solution for improving
access to health facilities for women in remote areas.
People had kind of read about it and thought this will
be the solution to East Timor’s problems because they
have trouble getting to the facilities : : :There was an
incredible momentum, and this feeling of ‘yes, that is
the answer to our problem’. – Manager, international
NGO, Dili
The prominence of maternity waiting homes was evident in
most interviews. The popularity of the concept was demonstrated
by the Ministry of Health holding a series of high-level policy
workshops (one attended by more than 100 people) and the fact
that maternity waiting homes had their own policy documents
(10, 15). Enthusiasm for maternity waiting homes spanned all
levels of the Ministry of Health, from senior decisions-makers
to the department of Policy and Planning to district level health
services (10). This meant that maternity waiting homes became
rapidly and firmly entrenched on the government’s agenda.
The characteristics of the concept itself meant that it was an
attractive policy option. First, it was seen to be a logical solution to
the problemof access to facility-based birthing services forwomen
living in remote areas.
I mean this is clearly one country where you would
think of that type of maternal waiting homes. It offers
itself quite naturally and logically. – Advisor 2, UN
agency, Dili
In addition, maternity waiting homes fit comfortably within
the medical model and the broader mandate of having all women
birth in a health facility. Maternity waiting homes were also a safe
policy option for politicians to promote, particularly over more
controversial issues, such as family planning. Family planning
was highly contentious in Timor-Leste because of society’s strong
Catholic values, the history of enforced contraception during the
Indonesian occupation, and the value placed on high fertility in
the pursuit of nation building.
My take is that the Ministry can get very passionate
about non-controversial things : : : [Family planning]
is really the issue here, but it’s too controversial so I
think there is a tendency to go with something that
is a bit neutral, maternity waiting homes being one of
those. – Program officer, UN agency, Dili
Another characteristic of maternity waiting homes was that
they were visible structures through which government action
could be demonstrated to the community. This was particularly
relevant given the widespread destruction of infrastructure by the
Indonesian military after the 1999 referendum. They were also
seen as a way of involving the community and bridging the gap
between district health services and outlying villages (15). This
investment in infrastructuremeantmaternity waiting homes were
an attractive option not only for national policy-makers but also
for district health managers and midwives.
I think it felt very attractive, an idea that was very
attractive and a possibility that it was not purely tech-
nical. It would probably mean the community is doing
something for themselves, so in that sense a very strong
political dimension. I mean, I don’t mean party politics
as such but I mean reaching out, connecting with the
community. – Advisor 2, UN agency, Dili
Once the national strategy was developed, The Ministry of
Health began socializing the idea to the districts by convening a
series of community meetings (10, 15). They were initially going
to be piloted in three districts, but this was increased to four,
then five districts. Then, in one dramatic up-scaling as part of
the Basic Services Package, they were proposed for every one of
the 65 sub-districts in the country (7). This represented a signif-
icant investment, with initial construction and equipment being
US$40,000–60,000 and monthly running costs of US$2,745 (14,
15). The costs in the pilot districts were initially met by UNFPA
and other local and international NGOs with the expectation the
government would take over management andmonthly expenses.
In the end, only two of the original pilot projects were imple-
mented. Both failed to improve access for women in remote areas
(14). Nevertheless, enthusiasm for the maternity waiting home
concept continued at the district level. Health managers, mid-
wives, and even local governments sought funding fromNGOs to
build maternity waiting homes in their own districts. As a result,
five additional facilities were built, which were modeled on the
maternity waiting home concept (21). This adoption by district
leaders marked a “tipping point” for maternity waiting homes in
Timor-Leste.
Somehow it took on its own life. Part of it was during the
course of 2005, something happened with this concept
and it got its own dynamics, which I never fully under-
stood. It was somehow, it went beyond the technical
people and it started to be an idea that floated and there
was far more interest in this concept than actually was
meant to be : : : It just popped up out of nowhere that
there will be waiting homes, waiting homes, waiting
homes. – Advisor 2, UN agency, Dili
Policy Actors
Individual policy actors were highly influential in getting the
maternity waiting home policy on the national agenda and social-
izing the idea to the districts. There was significant enthusiasm for
the policy at many levels within the Ministry of Health, but one
senior official stood out as the policy champion and promoted the
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org September 2015 | Volume 3 | Article 2124
Wild et al. Maternal health policy in Timor-Leste
idea at national workshops (15). The importance of this central
figure was raised in most interviews. Participants identified him
as the most significant actor influencing the change from the pilot
approach to a country-wide strategy for every sub-district.
Values and Interests
As discussed above, a motivating factor in the expansion of
maternity waiting homes was their highly visible and community-
oriented nature. Thus, building maternity waiting homes in oth-
erwise neglected areas was a way of demonstrating government
action and promoting party loyalty.
It was the [senior decision-maker’s] personal agenda. It
had something to do with the election perhaps. It was
a good campaign strategy. – Manager, international
NGO, Dili
External Actors and Influence
Although therewas ownership and enthusiasm formaternitywait-
ing homes evident atmultiple levels within theMinistry of Health,
there was growing caution voiced by representatives from inter-
national NGOs and UN agencies. Over time, maternity waiting
homes became a much more contested policy in Timor-Leste.
So I don’t have that feeling that much right now, that
it is going to be the one strategy. And I think pretty
much fromWHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, ourselves, I think
everybody is aware, they are sceptical about whether or
not that is the answer here. – Manager, international
NGO, Dili.
Ultimately, it was senior decision-makers in the Ministry of
Health who had the most influence over gaining support for
the maternity waiting home policy. Representatives from NGOs
and UN agencies sought to influence senior decision-makers to
support other programs and priorities. Theirmechanisms of influ-
ence included technical advice, writing proposals and policies,
advocacy, and engaging in official dialog as well as informal
discussions and relationship building.
Normally it will be the department who will act, it can
be going both ways as well. I mean it can be that the
Permanent Secretary, Planning, Vice-Minister, Minis-
ter, whoever, or an advisor, would have a strong view,
but will ensure then that the department is on line for
that. – Advisor 2, UN agency, Dili
A Ministry of Health official produced documents during an
interview which showed that 60% of the 2006/2007 health budget
was obtained from donors. Funding was an important avenue
of influence in that donors could decide which strategies were
funded. The Ministry of Health also influenced donors as they
lobbied external agencies to fund their proposals and provide
technical support to develop their policies.
You deal with the different organisations that come in
to support then you have to make sure that they will
support the objectives and the activities that you want.
Not to create another vertical program because any
organisation, they may have their policies, their role
and function, and they are already committed to do
something and you have to negotiate with our national
leaders. If not then it can just increase theworkload, you
just start but never address the problem. – Department
manager 1, Ministry of Health, Dili
Relationships between individuals were importantmechanisms
of influence and often transcended organizational affiliations.
Very early on, staff within the Maternal and Child Health Depart-
ment built alliances with a UNFPA advisor to progress the mater-
nity waiting home policy. The success of these relationships
depended on how long the advisor had spent in the country,
complementary personalities, and common goals and values.
I think the challenge here in East Timor is also because
there has been such an incredible flow of expats and
advisors and stuff throughout the last five years, I think
that there is a fairly high level of resistance on the part
of Timorese to outsiders coming in and trying to take
over or control the situation. So I think that there is
probably a tendency amongst the Timorese here even to
just want to deal with the people that they were familiar
with. – Manager, international NGO, Dili
The relationships and alliances formed between technical advi-
sors, NGO representatives, and Ministry of Health staff meant
that common goals had greater influence and more chance of
being supported. This is because NGOs and UN agencies had
expertise and control of the funds andMinistry of Health staff had
the legitimacy of the government. Advisors tended to have more
influence at lower levels of government given management staff
had less power, as well as the positioning of advisors as “experts.”
Although advisors could be influential on their own, they still
needed to work with the priorities of the government.
Decision-Making Power
Senior decision-makers heavily influenced the policy agenda
through exercising power inherent in their positions. For example,
after a piloting process had been agreed upon and formally written
up as a strategy (15), a high-level decision-maker in the Ministry
of Health sent a memorandum to managers in the Maternal and
Child Health department saying maternity waiting homes were to
be implemented in all 65 sub-districts in the country. This not only
circumvented the original approach but also represented a radical
departure from international guidelines which recommended that
they are implemented close to functioning obstetric services (12).
The decision-making power evident in the top positions within
theMinistry of Health was further demonstrated after the election
of the new government in 2007. Senior decision-makers rapidly
changed policy direction and the new focus became community
level primary health care and sub-district maternity clinics (22).
Thus, political priority for maternity waiting homes waned, which
was aided by the skepticism shown by some UN agency represen-
tatives (15). The change in policy was a direct result of leadership
changes and reflected the agenda of a senior decision-maker in
the new Ministry of Health. It also coincided with the release of
our in-country report which showed thematernity waiting homes
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that had been implemented were not improving access to birthing
facilities for women in remote areas (23).
It’s normal for a new leadership to come in and have
some ideas. He [a senior decision-maker] has been
working in academia for a long time and he was proba-
bly exposed to the evidence, or the lack of, onmaternity
waiting homes. And he was just like ‘take it out’. –
Project officer, international NGO, Dili
The Role of Evidence
The first process evaluation of the maternity waiting home in
Lospalos found it was rarely being used by women outside of
the immediate town center (15). Despite these results, it was
used as a success story by senior Ministry of Health officials.
Therefore, rather than critically and objectively reviewing the
available literature, evidence tended to be “constructed” by citing
authoritative documents [i.e., Ref. (12, 15)] in order to support
a given argument. The selective use of evidence was seen as the
normal state of affairs in policy-making.
I think it just gets to be this kind of wave sort of thing
where people hear about it and it’s like, ‘oh yeah that’s
great’, without really looking at what does the literature
say has been the history of these and how effective have
they been. – Manager, international NGO, Dili
In addition to written documents, aspects of the local context
were used to argue for the maternity waiting home policy (such
as the high proportion of women living in remote mountainous
areas), while other aspects of the context were ignored (such
as women’s preference for home birth and the lack of adequate
birthing facilities). Therefore, context and “logic” could be used
to argue that research conducted elsewhere was not applicable
locally.
If you have evidence outside it doesn’t mean necessarily
that it will apply here : : : it doesn’t mean that because
in Nepal [maternity waiting homes] didn’t work that
here it cannot work. You know. Because it depends on
the, it’s a cultural matter, there is a huge component,
cultural component. – Advisor, UN agency, Dili
Department managers appeared to be very open to the use
of evidence to inform policy and practice, but lacked decision-
making power to influence the national policy agenda. For exam-
ple, when the new government came into power and had different
priorities, Department managers who were previously support-
ive of maternity waiting homes were highly compliant to new
direction from their seniors.
So if you can provide [the department manager] the
evidence and back it up and explain how it will work,
she can be a really good advocate. And at the same
time, you know, just that tradition of using evidence
to inform practice is not always there. But that’s nor-
mal, it’s really normal. – Program officer, international
NGO, Dili
With thematernity waiting home policy being continually chal-
lenged, first by technical advisors then by a change in leadership,
our health system evaluation became part of the policy process.
The fact that our research was local, relevant, and timely meant
that the findings were taken up and used to justify a realignment
of policy away from this approach.
It all depends on the evidence that you will present.
If it’s good then we can support, but if it’s not good
then I think we just forget, we have other things to
do. – Department manager 1, Ministry of Health, Dili
It was fortuitous that the timing of this research coincided with
the change in government in 2007. The new Minister for Health
was a supervisor and collaborator in this study, and had intimate
knowledge of the research and its findings. Because of his existing
values, engagement with this and other research (24), as well as
direct observation during field trips to the districts, his policy pri-
orities werematernity clinics and community-based antenatal and
postnatal services, enacted through the Servico Integrado Saude
Communitaria (SISCa) strategy (25). The decision-making power
inherent in top government positions illustrates the importance of
involving these influential actors in research.
The ability to influence the policy agenda was also related to
being able to present evidence in a persuasive way, as well as
that evidence aligning with current political priorities. A further
examplewas during the development of the Basic Services Package
where the decision to stop providing home-birth services and
support only facility-based delivery was, in part, the result of the
evidence presented by an international consultant.
[The consultant] was not willing to compromise on the
intermediary phase of moving from home births: : :I
just know that he sent out the chapters for consultation
and the three delays and everything that he outlines, it
was really beautifully sketched to help people under-
stand the problems. But the solution was a facility-
based solution that he proposed, and people accepted
that. – Program officer, international NGO, Dili
Wehad quite a detailed discussion bothwith the policy-
makers, and with the technical department. And it was
quite a system of going through the whole range of, I
mean, one exercise was going through those Lancet,
that series of articles both on childmortality andmater-
nal mortality, and extracting the international experi-
ence from these, and cross checking to what extent they
applied here or they didn’t apply here. That was one
active exercise thatwas done during this process, as part
of the BSP [Basic Services Package] process. – Advisor,
UN agency, Dili
Discussion
The most important aspects which led to the prominence of
the maternity waiting home policy were (a) the political context
which allowed the idea to be imported through international
actors and gave Timorese control of health leadership after the
referendum, (b) the characteristics of the policy in that it was a
visible, non-controversial, and “logical” solution to the problem
of access, and (c) the power of senior policy actors within the
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Ministry of Health who promoted the strategy that fit within their
value system.
International policies are increasing in influence through pro-
cesses of globalization, and the political context of a country can
create windows of opportunity for those ideas to be transferred.
This was illustrated in Timor-Leste through the influx of NGOs
and UN agencies after the referendum and the prioritizing of
maternal health as a national issue. The maternity waiting home
concept spread through organizational structures linking techni-
cal advisors, such as those from UNFPA, with national Ministry
of Health staff. Thus, global policy ideas could be communicated
directly down a channel of influence. A country’s political context
is important because it means newly established, poorly resourced
or vulnerable states are more susceptible to the outside influence
of organizations, individuals, and their values, as well as global
policy trends. Steinberg and Baxter (26) have pointed out that
community processes and structures create barriers to entry, and
outsiders encounter less resistance entering systems that lack clear
leadership.
The emergence of the Ministry of Health after Independence
in 2002, and their relative coherence and strong leadership (27),
resulted in ownership of the maternity waiting home policy and
greater autonomy over which policies would be supported. This
makes thematernity waiting home policy an interesting case study
in that it received much more attention and support from the
national and district level than was expected. This is in contrast to
most other global strategies introduced in low-income countries,
for example, HIV policy (28, 29), the Safe Motherhood Initiative
(30), and DOTS in tuberculosis treatment (31).
With the proliferation of NGOs and UN agencies in weak states
it is widely held that global policies and donors have significant
influence over national policy frameworks. Our findings from
this case study, however, support Shiffman (32) conclusions that
efforts by national leaders were more important than that of inter-
national donors in predicting whether maternal mortality made
it onto the policy agenda. Similarly, Behague et al. (3) (p. 1544)
also found “a powerful group of national elite control research and
policy agendas.” They argue that these national elites have a strong
vested interest in global undertakings and tend to be removed
from the local realities found in their countries.
Cobb et al. (33) have proposed a “mobilizationmodel” of policy
which is worth revisiting because it closely reflects the policy
process surrounding maternity waiting homes in Timor-Leste as
well as that described by Shiffman (32) and Behague et al. (3).
In this model, government decision-makers place issues on the
agenda, then promote the idea and gather support for implemen-
tation because they lack institutional and financial resources. This
model of policy ismost often found in hierarchical societies and in
contexts where there is social distance between political elites and
the public (33). Similarly, Mills (34) argues that rather than policy
reflecting the needs of the people, it most often represents the
interests of the most powerful individuals within society and the
broader ideologies they support. Thus, it appears the models for
policy developed decades ago in high-income countries (19, 33,
34) are still applicable in a range of diverse contexts today, includ-
ing low-income and post-conflict settings. The EBP movement is
therefore an important shift.
The way in which evidence was used in advocating for mater-
nity waiting homes in Timor-Leste reflects Howlett and Ramesh
(35) (p. 122) experience in that “symbols and statistics, both real
and fabricated, are used to back up one’s preferred understand-
ing of the causes of the problem.” Rather than EBP, it appears
the “solution” of maternity waiting homes became joined to the
“problem” of access (2). In addition to drawing on documented
case studies of maternity waiting homes (12, 15), advocates cited
certain aspects of the local context in order to justify the policy
(difficulties with transport and remoteness) while simultaneously
ignoring other underlying requirements [lack of quality birthing
facilities, electricity, running water and emergency obstetric care,
see, for example, Ref. (15, 23, 36)].
This use of evidence is consistent with the literature, which
suggests policies are legitimated rather than informed by evidence
(3). The problem with this approach is that it limits the use of
research for context-specific problem solving. Behague et al. (3)
(p. 1542) studied maternal and neonatal health policy in five
developing countries and found “new ‘fad-like’ evidence-based
policies tend to be proposed and adopted with such enthusiasm
that they undermine a comprehensive approach, and are used to
replace, rather than complement, previous endorsed policies.” In
their review of theory in health policy change, de Leeuw et al. (18)
found policy is grounded in value-based rather than evidence-
based ontologies and tends to address a tangible yet insignificant
element of the complexity of the real problem.
So what does this mean for the role of evidence in policy-
making, and the EBP movement in general? We argue that it
is important to recognize that politics surrounding evidence is
inevitable (37) and that policy-making will never be free of bias
(nor will research, which is why it is so critical to be reflexive
and open about our own values). The value of rigorous, context-
specific research is that advocacy groups and policy champions
have the necessary data to back their case or indeed to refute it.
Our research was taken up by policy-makers because it addressed
an existing policy problem, was timely and credible. Credibility
was generated not only through the use of rigorous scientific
methods, but by being affiliated with an independent organization
and connected to high-level decision-makers. Involving policy-
makers from the outset of the research was an important factor
in the latter.
Given the extensive examples in the literature which illustrate
how evidence is used to legitimate policy (2, 3, 18, 35), the type of
research that is conducted and for whom is a critical question. We
argue for a national research agenda that incorporates the views
of stakeholders who are “seldom heard” rather than developing
research priorities based only on a review of existing literature (38)
and the priorities of the elite. To this end, rural women need to be
included in developing and conducting maternal health research.
The Timor-Leste Cabinet for Health Research and Development
(CHR&D)was established in 2010 to facilitate and promote health
research. We argue that it is critical that the CHR&D incorporate
a rural women’s research and policy agenda to understand what
mix of facility, community, and home-based antenatal, birthing,
and postnatal services work best for women and families and for
reducing morbidity and mortality, and to feed this research into
policy improvements.
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Conclusion
This research demonstrates the importance of political context,
policy characteristics, and the power of national elites in deter-
miningwhich policies are supported.We found high profile actors
within the Ministry of Health supported policies in their bureau-
cratic interests and broader values. External actors, however, had
much less influence over the maternity waiting home policy than
expected in this context. The characteristics of the policy meant
maternity waiting homes were an attractive option because they
were visible and non-controversial, provided a logical solution
to a priority problem, and were consistent with the dominant
ideology of facility-based births. The people most affected by the
policy, particularly pregnant and/or rural women, had very little
influence over the maternity waiting home agenda, or maternal
health policy in general.
Our study of the policy process showed that research was used
to both inform new policy directions and support pre-defined
policy agendas. This confirms the finding that policy-making is
a symbolic sense-making activity rather than a purely method-
ological enterprise (18). Thus, the potential impact of research
on policy lies in its timeliness and relevance and the connec-
tion between researchers and policy-makers. The next steps in
the pursuit of EBP entail not only working with policy-makers
to set the research agenda but also incorporating the views of
those “seldom heard” in order to conduct research that adequately
addresses the complexity of real-world problems. The effect of
these participatory models should be evaluated.
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